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Rationality in medical treatment decisions:
Is there a sunk-cost effect?
Brian H. Bornstein, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
Christine Emler, Earl K. Long Medical Center, Baton Rouge, LA
Gretchen B. Chapman, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ

Abstract
Objective: To assess residents’ propensity to display the sunk-cost effect, an irrational decision-making bias, in medical
treatment decisions; and to compare residents’ and undergraduates’ susceptibility to the bias in non-medical, everyday
behaviors.
Design: Cross-sectional, in-person survey.
Setting: Louisiana State University, two locations: Medical Center-Baton Rouge and Main Campus–Psychology
Department.
Participants: Internal medicine and family practice residents (N = 36, Mdn age = 27) and college undergraduates (N =
40, Mdn age = 20).
Measurements and main results: Residents evaluated medical and non-medical situations that varied the amount of
previous investment and whether the present decision maker was the same or different from the person who had
made the initial investment. They rated reasons both for continuing the initial decision (e.g., stay with the medication
already in use) and for switching to anew alternative (e.g., a different medication). There were two main findings:
First, the residents’ ratings of whether to continue or switch medical treatments were not influenced by the amount of
the initial investment (p’s > 0.05). Second, residents’ reasoning was more normative in medical than in non-medical
situations, in which it paralleled that of undergraduates (p’s < 0.05).
Conclusions: Medical residents’ evaluation of treatment decisions reflected good reasoning, in that they were not
influenced by the amount of time and/or money that had already been invested in treating a patient. However, the
residents did demonstrate a sunk-cost effect in evaluating non-medical situations. Thus, any advantage in decision
making that is conferred by medical training appears to be domain specific.
Keywords: Decision making, Biases, Medical education

Introduction
Sound decision making is a key element of good medicine; thus, decision errors often have clinical importance.

A large body of psychological research has identified a
number of decision errors and irrational biases in non-
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medical domains (Baron, 1994). Medical decision making research has sought to uncover some of the parallels
between cognitive biases which exist in the non-medical
world and in the medical world (Detmer et al., 1978; Elstein et al., 1978; Dawson and Arkes, 1987; Elstein, 1988;
for an inventory of medical decision-making biases, see
Hershberger et al., 1994). Some of the biases that have
been shown to influence medical judgment include the
omission bias (Asch et al., 1994), availability bias (Poses
and Anthony, 1991), hindsight bias (Arkes et al., 1981;
Dawson et al., 1988), a bias to ignore negative evidence
when attempting to synthesize information (Mazur and
Hickam, 1990), framing effects (McNeil et al., 1984) and
outcome bias (Gruppen et al., 1994).
For example, Dawson et al. (1988) asked physicians
attending clinicopathologic conferences to estimate the
probability of five possible diagnoses. They found that
physicians who were informed of the correct diagnosis prior to making their probability estimates ranked
it higher in their differential diagnosis than physicians
who were not told the correct diagnosis beforehand.
This hindsight bias was especially prevalent in less experienced physicians.
One bias which is not represented in the research on
medical decision making is the escalation, or sunk cost,
effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992). The
sunk cost effect occurs when a decision maker continues to invest resources into a previously selected action
or plan even after the plan has proven to be the suboptimal option. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) told
participants to imagine that they had purchased tickets
for two non-refundable ski trips on the same weekend.
Even though they were told to assume further that they
would enjoy the trip purchased second more, a majority
of participants chose the trip purchased first, which had
cost them more money. From an economic perspective,
choosing the first trip is suboptimal; because the money for both trips has been irretrievably sunk, one ought
to choose the trip that would be more enjoyable.
The sunk cost effect has been shown to be a robust
cognitive bias in a variety of non-medical domains, such
as personal decisions (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Bornstein
and Chapman, 1994), investment decisions in business
(Staw, 1976; Garland, 1990), and employee performance
evaluations (Bazerman et al., 1982). A number of reasons
may underlie decision makers’ sunk cost behavior (Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). The most commonly cited reason for why people display /’ the sunk cost effect is the
desire not to waste already expended resources (Frisch,
1993; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Decision makers
may feel that if they abandon the original plan, they will
be wasting the resources already invested. For example,
Arkes and Blumer’s subjects may have chosen the more
expensive, less enjoyable ski trip because they felt that if
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they did not take the trip, the money already spent on it
would be wasted.
Decision makers may have other rationales for attending to sunk costs as well. One such reason is the
desire to teach oneself (or another person) a lesson
about how to make better decisions in the future; another possible reason is the desire to appear consistent
in one’s decisions. Learning a lesson is especially likely
to come into play when one person is making a decision
on behalf of another (e.g., a parent deciding what a child
should do), as opposed to making a decision for oneself
(Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Consistency is an especially important motivation for sunk cost behavior when
decision makers are induced to justify their decisions,
either publicly or privately (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994).
Similarly, decision makers who feel personally responsible for an original plan’s consequences are more likely
to display sunk-cost behavior than when someone else is
responsible (Staw, 1976; Whyte, 1993; Schoorman and
Holahan, 1996).
In this study, we explore the role that the sunk cost
effect plays in medical decision making. Sunk costs
could affect several aspects of medical decision making. For instance, a physician might be more reluctant
to change medications after an ineffective trial of a relatively expensive medicine as opposed to an inexpensive
medicine. Similarly, a practitioner might be less willing to entertain an alternative diagnosis after spending
several hours or days pursuing an apparently inaccurate
option than if less time were spent looking at the erroneous diagnosis. In this study, we asked whether resident
physicians would display the sunk cost bias by being
more likely to recommend continuing with a medical
management plan when the initial investment was relatively high (compared to when it was relatively low),
even though patient outcomes would be improved by
switching to a different management strategy. Because
personal responsibility for a failed decision influences
one’s tendency to continue with it (Schoorman and
Holahan, 1996), we also manipulated responsibility by
varying whether the current treating physician was the
same as or different from the physician who had made
the initial treatment decision.
One characteristic of experts across a variety of
fields is that they tend to make more accurate and reliable judgments than novices (Ericsson and Smith, 1991),
a finding that holds true for increasing levels of medical
expertise (Elstein et al., 1978; Patel and Groen, 1991).
The expertise literature also indicates that, on the whole,
the benefits of expertise are domain specific (Ericsson
and Smith, 1991). We therefore compared medical residents’ reasoning about medical scenarios to their reasoning about non-medical scenarios. We predicted that the
residents would be less subject to the sunk cost fallacy
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when reasoning in their area of expertise than when reasoning out of it.
We predicted that when medical residents did fall
prey to the sunk cost fallacy, their motivation would
be to appear consistent rather than to avoid wasting
resources already invested. Inconsistency in medical
treatment might be perceived as an implicit admission
of error and thereby indicate low-quality care. The consequences of perceived sub-standard care are potentially
severe: malpractice claims, loss of one’s patient population or loss of respect from one’s peers, all of which
could curtail professional advancement. Thus, consistency may be thought of as a good quality, and the need
for physicians to see themselves in a good light would
lead them to choose the consistency argument over the
waste argument when displaying the sunk cost effect.
The motivation to appear consistent should therefore be
stronger for physicians in the medical domain than it
would be in non-medical situations. One reason for this
tendency may be the “it didn’t happen because of me”
phenomenon (Detmer et al., 1978). Detmer et al. found
that physicians tended to estimate mortality rates for an
entire surgical service to be higher than the physician’s
own patients’ mortality rates. The researchers felt that
this might result from “a need to see oneself in a good
light and yet not distort one’s self-image” (Detmer et al.,
1978, p. 682).
We also compared residents’ reasoning about nonmedical scenarios to that of undergraduate students. If expertise gained through medical training transfers to areas
outside of the resident’s medical expertise, then medical
residents would be less likely to display the sunk cost
bias than undergraduates in non-medical situations. On
the other hand, if expertise is completely domain-specific,
then residents and undergraduates should show equivalent performance on the non-medical scenarios. Thus,
there are two (non-orthogonal) comparisons that are central to the present study: medical residents’ decisions in
medical versus non-medical situations, and decisions in
non-medical situations of resident participants versus undergraduate participants.

Method
Participants
The physician participants were 36 residents (26
males, 9 females, and one participant who failed to indicate gender) drawn from one internal medicine and two
family practice residency programs in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The residents ranged in age from 24 to 45 years old
(M = 30.23, Mdn = 27), and they had been in residency an
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average of 1.91 years (Mdn = 2). The undergraduate participants were 40 undergraduates (9 males and 31 females)
from Louisiana State University who were between 18
and 33 years old (M = 20.48, Mdn = 20). No monetary
incentive was offered in either case; the undergraduates
received extra course credit for participating.
Materials and design
Participants rated decision makers’ options in a
number of hypothetical scenarios (eight for the residents
and four for the undergraduates). It is not uncommon to
study decision making by haying participants evaluate
others’ behavior, in both non-medical (Baron, 1994) and
medical domains (Gruppen et al., 1994). The sunk cost
literature has failed to find differences in participants’
judgments depending on whether they are asked to make
decisions themselves or to evaluate another’s decisions
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Bornstein and Chapman,
1994).
The four non-medical scenarios were taken from
those used previously by Bornstein and Chapman (1994);
see Appendix A for a sample scenario. Four medical scenarios were created such that each scenario presented an
ongoing plan and an alternative course of action, as in
the non-medical scenarios. For example, in one of the
cases (see Appendix A), a patient was started on antisecretory medication because of gastroesophageal reflux.
The medication was ineffective and produced drowsiness. The physician must decide whether to maintain the
original treatment or discontinue the medication. The
medical scenarios were developed by the physician author (ACE) and were reviewed by other physicians for
their plausibility.
Two independent variables were varied within each
scenario. First, the current plan had been initiated either
by the present decision maker herself or by another person (another physician for the medical scenarios). Second, either a high or low level of resources had already
been invested in the current plan.
Each non-medical participant read the four nonmedical scenarios, one for each combination of the two
variables: (1) identity of the original decision maker
(same vs. other); (2) amount of initial investment (high
vs. low). Each physician participant read the four nonmedical scenarios as well as the four medical scenarios.
The four medical scenarios also had representations of
all combinations of the same two within-subject variables as described above. The order of the conditions
for both the medical and non-medical scenarios was
counterbalanced according to a Latin-square design.
The scenarios were presented in one of two different
orders.
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The entire questionnaire took 20-30 min for the physicians to complete (8 scenarios) and 10–20 min for the
non-medical participants to complete (4 scenarios).
Results
Medical residents

Procedure
After reading each scenario, participants rated three
possible responses using a 10-point scale, with 10 representing “a very good response, the one that [the decision
maker] should definitely follow,” and 1 representing “a
very bad response, that [the decision maker] should definitely not follow” (Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Participants were allowed to use any number between 1 and
10 as often as they chose. The three possible responses,
which were tailored to fit each scenario, were as follows:
“normative” — ignore sunk costs and switch to the new,
better plan; “waste” — stick with the initial plan so as
not to waste the resources already invested; and “consistency” — stick with the initial plan to be consistent with
previous behavior. Each response appeared in each ordinal position at least once in the four scenarios of each type
(medical and non-medical).

For the residents’ data, we first conducted separate ANOVAs on the ratings given to each response (normative,
waste and consistency) as a function of three within-subject independent variables: type of scenario (medical or
non-medical), identity of original decision maker (same
or other) and amount of resources already invested (high
or low).
The normative response received the highest mean
rating by residents in both the medical and non-medical
scenarios (see Table 1). Contrary to our prediction, they
did not rate the consistency response higher than the waste
response in the medical scenarios. However, the residents
did rate both the waste and consistency arguments higher
in non-medical as opposed to medical situations, and the
normative response was rated higher in medical than in
non-medical cases (F(1, 32)s > 6.67, p’s < 0.05). This pattern indicates that residents are less susceptible to the sunk
cost fallacy in medical than in non-medical settings.
The main effect of scenario type on ratings of the consistency response was qualified by an interaction between
scenario type and identity of the original decision maker,
F(1, 32) = 5.61, p < 0.05 (see Fig. 1, left and middle bars).
For medical cases, the consistency response was rated
higher when the treating physician had initiated the original plan herself than when another physician had; however, for non-medical scenarios, the reverse was true. Thus,
the attractiveness of the consistency response in medical

Fig. 1. Mean ratings of the consistency response as a function of identity of the original decision maker (same vs. other) for both residents (medical and non-medical scenarios) and undergraduates (non-medical scenarios only).
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settings appears to be greater when the original decision
maker and the present decision maker are the same person
than when they are different.
There was no main effect of amount of resources already invested for the waste or consistency arguments,
F(1, 32)s < 1.75, p’s > 0.19, nor did level of investment
interact with type of scenario or person making the original decision, F(1, 32)s < 3.2, p’s > 0.3. For the consistency response, there was a marginally significant decision maker by amount of resources interaction, F(1, 32) =
3.19, p < 0.09. This interaction indicates that consistency
was rated higher for high than low resources invested
only in the case where the present decision maker had
made the original decision.
For the normative response, there was a marginal
main effect of resources invested, F(1, 32) = 3.43, p <
0.08, indicating that the normative response was rated
somewhat lower when a large amount of resources had
already been invested. There was no interaction between
amount of resources invested and type of scenario, F(1,
32) < 1, p > 0.6, but there was a 2-way interaction between amount of resources and person making the original decision, F(1, 32) = 7.99, p < 0.01, indicating that the
normative response was rated higher for low resources
invested only if the original decision had been made by
the physician himself. In addition, there was a 3-way
interaction among amount of resources, scenario type,
and identity of the original decision maker, F(1, 32) =
10.95, p < 0.005, indicating that the interaction between
amount of resources and identity of the decision maker
on ratings of the normative response occurred only for
the non-medical scenarios (see Table 2). This pattern
suggests further that the predicted interaction between
scenario type and amount of resources may occur only
when the present decision maker made the initial decision; it fails to occur when someone else made the original decision.
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Non-medical scenarios: residents vs. undergraduates
We next compared the responses of both groups of
participants on the non-medical scenarios. The betweensubjects independent variable was participants (residents
or undergraduates), and the within-subjects variables
were identity of the original decision maker (same or
other) and amount of resources already invested (high
or low). The dependent variables again were the ratings
given to each of the three responses, analyzed in separate
univariate ANOVAs.
Undergraduates gave higher responses to the nonnormative responses (waste and consistency) than did
residents, F(1, 68)s > 10.24, p’s < 0.01 (see Table 1). This
finding is another indication that professional training
may improve reasoning. It should be noted, however, that
even the undergraduates rated the normative argument
higher than both the waste and consistency responses.
Across all participants (both the residents and the
undergraduates), the waste response was rated higher
and the normative response lower when a high level of
resources had already been invested, F(1, 68)s > 6.96,
p’s < 0.02 (see Table 3). Like the waste response, the
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consistency response was slightly higher when a high level of resources had been invested, though this effect was
not statistically significant, F(1,68) = 2.17, p > 0.14. This
pattern indicates that participants viewed continuing with
the original plan as more attractive when they (or someone else) had already invested many resources into that
plan. In other words, both residents and undergraduates
demonstrated the sunk cost effect in judging non-medical
situations.
To test whether the undergraduates showed more of a
sunk cost effect than the medical residents, we examined
the interaction between participant group and amount of
resources invested. There was no such interaction for the
waste or consistency response, F(1, 68)s < 1, p’s > 0.3.
This interaction for the normative response was marginally significant, F(1, 68) = 3.16, p < 0.09, suggesting a
somewhat stronger effect of invested resources for the
undergraduates (see Table 3).
Both the undergraduates and the residents rated the
consistency argument higher when another decision
maker had made the original decision, F(1, 68) = 12.55,
p < 0.001 (see Fig. 1, middle and right bars). Thus, for
non-medical scenarios (for both groups of participants),
consistency was rated higher when another person had
made the original decision, whereas, as reported above, in
medical cases the resident participants rated consistency
higher when the treating physician herself had made the
original decision. This finding indicates that intra-individual consistency with past decisions is valued more by
physicians evaluating medical decisions, while inter-individual consistency with past decisions is deemed more
important in the other settings studied.
Discussion
The present experiment yielded several interesting
findings concerning the reasoning of medical residents
about hypothetical situations in which a person was portrayed as having to decide whether to persist with an original plan of action or switch to a more cost-effective alternative. First, the residents made fairly rational choices
overall. They consistently rated the normative argument
as the most attractive alternative while giving appropriately low ratings to both non-normative responses. Furthermore, their judgments when evaluating treatment options were not influenced by the amount of prior resources
that had already been invested; that is, they did not demonstrate a sunk cost effect in evaluating medical treatment
decisions. Second, they were more rational — in the sense
of viewing switching to the more effective alternative as a
relatively attractive option, while viewing continuing , the
failed plan as relatively unattractive — when the decision
involved choosing a course of medical treatment than
when it involved everyday behaviors. Third, even though
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consistency was not a very attractive argument overall,
the residents were more concerned about maintaining
consistency with a previous medical treatment decision
when that initial decision had been made by the present
treating physician than when it had been made by someone else. However, they viewed consistency with a previous non-medical decision as more important when the
initial decision had been made by someone else, a pattern
that was also observed in the undergraduates’ evaluations
of non-medical decisions.
Although residents and undergraduates were similar
in the weight they gave to the consistency rationale for
continuing with a plan of action in non-medical situations, there were differences between the two groups of
participants as well. Specifically, the undergraduates gave
higher ratings to the non-normative responses (i.e., waste
and consistency) than did the residents.
Although previous research has documented a number of cognitive biases in medical decision makers (e.g.,
Elstein et al., 1978; Dawson and Arkes, 1987; Hershberger et al., 1994), the present findings do not provide much
additional support for the notion that physicians are poor
reasoners. Most notably, residents’ evaluations of treatment decisions were not influenced by the amount of time
and/or money that had already been invested in treating a
particular patient; in other words, they did not fall prey to
the sunk cost effect when judging different treatment options. Despite the generally robust nature of the sunk cost
effect in the psychological literature (Arkes and Blumer,
1985; Brockner, 1992; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994),
resident participants’ judgments about the optimal course
of treatment were not influenced by previous treatment
decisions. This encouraging finding supports other recent
research indicating that biases in medical decision making may be more limited than previously thought (Christensen et al., 1995).
The resident participants did consider it more important for physicians faced with treatment decisions to
appear consistent by continuing with a failed treatment
plan when the physicians themselves had made the initial decision, compared to when another physician had
made the initial decision. This finding supports previous
research showing that. personal responsibility increases
sunk cost behavior (Staw, 1976; Schoorman and Holahan,
1996) and that the desire to appear consistent — either to
others or to oneself — is a powerful motive for behavior
(Bobocel and Meyer, 1994); In deciding on medical treatments, physicians must consider not only what is rational
— that is, the medically optimal strategy — but also what
is socially desirable. Because inconsistency in medical
treatment might be perceived as an implicit admission of
error on the physician’s part, it could lead to a host of
undesirable social consequences, such as future litigation
and loss of professional respect and opportunities. These
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effects would likely be even more salient in real situations, as opposed to the hypothetical decisions used in the
present study.
Unfortunately, the residents’ generally normative
behavior in medical situations did not generalize to nonmedical settings. Although the medical and non-medical
situations were not directly comparable, research on the
sunk cost effect has found it to be very robust across a variety of situations (e.g., Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Larrick
et al., 1990; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). The medical
and non-medical scenarios were analogous in the sense
that both scenario types presented participants with situations in which an initial decision had proven unsuccessful, and a subsequent decision was then required either to
continue with the original strategy or to switch to a more
optimal alternative. In evaluating non-medical situations,
residents rated sub-optimal responses higher (and the
normative response lower) than when they were evaluating medical situations; furthermore, they demonstrated a
sunk cost effect in judging everyday decisions. Although
residents found the waste and consistency responses to
everyday decisions less attractive than did undergraduates, they were nonetheless influenced by the amount of
the original investment. In fact, undergraduates and residents were equally likely to be influenced by the size of
a prior investment when reasoning about everyday situations; that is, there was no significant interaction between
participant group and level of sunk cost. Thus, it appears
that some aspect of residents’ training may inoculate them
against the sunk cost bias within the medical domain, but
that they fail to apply this higher reasoning standard to the
same degree in other settings.
Interestingly, consistency was viewed as a more attractive rationale for continuing the original plan in nonmedical scenarios (by both groups of participants) when
someone else had made the initial decision than when the
same decision maker had. This reversal provides evidence
that physicians reason differently within their domain of
expertise than outside it. Although some evidence exists
suggesting that training in reasoning can transfer across
situations (Nisbett et al., 1987; Larrick et al., 1990), the
present results support the more common finding that the
benefits of expertise are domain specific (Ericsson and
Smith, 1991).
We can only speculate as to how medical training
might serve to prevent the sunk cost effect in making
medical decisions. Residents probably are not following
an abstract principle about ignoring sunk cost; for if they
were, they would show equivalent reasoning in the medical and non-medical scenarios. It also seems unlikely that
residents are following an explicit domain-specific rule
about ignoring sunk costs. Instead, they may be following
domain-specific rules about which aspects of the situation
to attend to. Decision principles that emphasize control-
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ling the quality of care, like “Pick the most effective treatment” or “Maximize the patient’s outcome,” would result
in no sunk cost effect even though these principles do not
explicitly mention sunk costs. However, because these
principles are medicine-specific, they would be less likely
to be applied to everyday decisions. The current study did
not query residents as to the reasons or principles behind
their decisions (except by asking them to rate their agreement with the three arguments provided). Future research
needs to question physicians in a more open-ended manner as they actually engage in treatment decisions.
In conclusion, the present study yielded three major
findings: First, residents did not exhibit a sunk cost effect
in evaluating treatment decisions; that is, their evaluation of different courses of treatment was not affected by
how much time or money had been invested in the initial treatment regimen. Second, the residents’ reasoning
about medical situations appeared to reflect a sense that
physicians should be consistent in their patient management decisions. This desire for consistency might reflect
a belief that changing treatments would be perceived as
an admission of error . Third, this relatively normative
reasoning on the part of the residents did not generalize
to their non-medical decisions, in which their judgments
— like those of undergraduates — did demonstrate a
sunk cost effect. Thus, any advantage conferred by medical training in avoiding the sunk cost effect is limited to
the medical domain. Overall, the present findings offer
both good news and bad news: The good news is that
doctors are not influenced by sunk costs in evaluating
medical treatment decisions. The bad news is that this
capacity for optimal reasoning does not generalize to
non-medical situations.
Appendix A. Sample scenarios
Both of the following scenarios are in the same original
decision maker-low sunk cost condition. Alternate .conditions (i.e., other original decision maker and high sunk
cost) are shown in parentheses.
Non-medical type
Agatha decides that she wants to take cello lessons
(Agatha’s husband decides to give Agatha a cello and
cello lessons for her birthday). She (he) spends US$100
(US$1,000) on a beginner cello and an additional US$40
(US$200) on the first month (3 months) of cello lessons.
After 1 month (3 months) of lessons, Agatha realizes that
she no longer enjoys the cello and wants to stop taking
lessons. That is, it is almost certain that if Agatha signs up
for more lessons, she will not enjoy them and will never
enjoy playing the cello. What should Agatha do?
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Medical type
Ms. S., a 54-year-old female with a history of heartburn,
comes to Dr. Gordon’s office. Ms. S. had an upper GI series
done 6 weeks ago which showed that she had gastroesophageal reflux (Ms. S. states that 6 weeks earlier her daughter’s
doctor ordered an upper GI series on her which showed that
she had gastroesophageal reflux). Dr. Gordon (her daughter’s
doctor) gave her a prescription for Stopcid, an antisecretory
medicine, which she has to take twice a day and is associated
with some drowsiness. She purchased a four-month supply
for US$40 (US$400). Ms. S. has been taking the medicine
for 2 months and returns to Dr. Gordon’s office because she
is still having heartburn symptoms and is tired all the time.
What should Dr. Gordon do?
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